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Abstract
An extensive literature shows the importance of investment policy for sus-
tainability of resource-based economies by examining the role of investment
in current utility change (CUC) for a competitive optimizing economy. This
paper extends some of these results by analysing the dependence of CUC
on genuine investment, expressed in marginal resource productivity, under
dynamic ine¢ ciency. This ine¢ ciency arises when a social planner, due to
imperfection in knowledge or in institutions, does not take into account devi-
ations of real economy from a theoretical model. These deviations or distor-
tions, connected with the resource extraction, can inuence utility, produc-
tion, the balance equation, and the dynamics of the reserve, modifying the
standard Hotelling rule. The analysis of this natural discrepancy between
theory and real life implies that: rst, institutional and resource policies
in ine¢ cient economies may be more important for CUC than investment
policy; and secondly, under uncertainties in production possibilities and in
damages from economic activities, sustainability requires a more cautious
resource policy than is advised by a theory.
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1. Introduction
Sustainability of real economies is always evaluated under uncertainties
in future production possibilities and in various distortions such as institu-
tional imperfections, economic wastefulness, damages from the processes of
production and consumption to utility and to production itself. These un-
certainties lead to the errors in the decisions of a social planner and cause
deviations from an e¢ cient and optimal path of economic development.
The literature on sustainability evaluation of resource-based economies
o¤ers an indicator of sustainable development, called genuine saving or gen-
uine investment (GI), which is equal to increase in man-made capital minus
resource depletion. This indicator was developed in the studies of the change
in the current (present) value of consumption or utility at a specic moment
of time in a dynamically e¢ cient optimizing economy. Straightforward ap-
plications of these results to real-world situations can form the impression
that, for sustainability, it is enough to invest in a proper way into man-made
and human capital regardless of the pattern of extraction.
The current paper extends some of these studies by assuming that a real
economy deviates from theoretical paths, but a planner, due to imperfection
in knowledge or in institutions, uses the policies developed for an undistorted
model. The paper provides the examples of distortions, which show that this
natural discrepancy between a model and real life results in dynamically
ine¢ cient paths and, in some cases, unsustainability of the economy.
The idea of the indicator GI was o¤ered in Hartwick (1977) as the in-
vest resource rent rule for the problem formulated in Solow (1974) for
the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS)1 model of a perfectly competitive
resource-based economy satisfying the standard Hotelling rule (HR) as a nec-
essary condition of dynamic e¢ ciency. For this model, zero GI with resource
depletion measured in market prices leads to constant per capita consump-
tion over time. Dixit et al. (1980) extended the Hartwick rule by showing
for a more general production function that GI that is constant over time
in present prices is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a constant path
of utility.2 Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 303-306), Hamilton and Hartwick
1This model with the Cobb-Douglas production function was developed in the works
of Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974).
2Constant investment in present prices means that investment in current prices is grow-
ing with the rate of discount.
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(2005), and Hamilton et al. (2006) analyzed the link between GI in current
prices and current change in per capita consumption. Hamilton and Witha-
gen (2007) derived the result of Dixit et al. (1980) (including also the result of
Hamilton and Hartwick (2005)) in a more general setting (with internalized
externalities), showing that instantaneous utility increases if and only if GI
decreases in present prices. All these results were obtained for a competitive
dynamically e¢ cient economy.
Besides theoretical studies, variants of the indicator GI were used for prac-
tical evaluation of sustainability. For example, Pearce and Atkinson (1993)
o¤ered a simple indicator of weak sustainability3 based on the assertion that
an economy is sustainable if it saves more than the combined depreciation
on the two forms of capital(man-made and natural). A variant of this in-
dicator, modied for open economies, has been developed in Proops et al.
(1999). These indicators were used in both papers to classify a number of
countries into sustainable and unsustainable. Hamilton and Clemens (1999)
developed a theory of genuine saving by adding the investment in human
capital to traditional net savings and subtracting the value of resource de-
pletion and environmental damage. The value of genuine saving was o¤ered
as an indicator of sustainability, and this indicator was used for comparing
sustainability of a wide range of developing countries. Hence, as Hamilton
and Hartwick (2005, p. 615) noted, the magnitude of net investmentor
genuine savingshas become a central focus in the measurement of the sus-
tainability of an economy.
Proposition 1 (Section 2) of this paper extends Proposition 1 of Hamil-
ton and Hartwick (2005), providing the link between GI and current utility
change (CUC) in a dynamically ine¢ cient economy.4 The result shows that:
1) CUC may be determined only by the inuence of ine¢ ciency when this in-
uence is not close to zero; 2) ine¢ ciency asymmetrically a¤ects the ability
of investment to inuence the sign of CUC, and this asymmetry is mutu-
ally inverted for large resource-poor and small resource-rich economies; 3)
resource-based economies can be classied by the importance of investment
or resource policies or both for CUC.
The examples of distortions (Section 3) include: 1) a resource-augmenting
3Weak sustainability of growth (development) is dened by Pezzey (1992) as nonde-
creasing per capita consumption (utility).
4A particular case of this result, when economy is dynamically e¢ cient, can be obtained
from the results of Dixit et al. (1980) and Hamilton and Withagen (2007).
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technical change (Takayama 1980) that distorts the optimal dynamics of the
resource stock and leads to a sustainable but dynamically ine¢ cient economy
when a planner does not take it into account; 2) irreversible damages to utility
and production resulting from the resource use (e.g., Stollery 1998) that lead
to ine¢ cient and unsustainable outcomes when the planner ignores these
e¤ects; and 3) insecure property rights (Arrow et al. 2003) that also cause
ine¢ cient use of the resource and unsustainability of the economy, unless
corrected by institutional transformations and resource policies.
The results of this study illustrate that, for sustainability, it is preferable
to underestimate future production possibilities and overestimate damages
since this policy of extra caution can reduce irreversible losses. Of course,
this policy may lead to dynamic ine¢ ciency caused by an overly conservative
resource policy, but with updates in knowledge, the policy can be corrected,
and the economy can be asymptotically e¢ cient.
The paper also notes that an indicator that reects the changes in current
utility can be, by construction, not sensitive to the changes in the ability of an
economy to maintain non-declining utility during a long period of time. As
Arrow et al. (2003) showed for imperfect economies, the accounting price5 of
a natural resource can be considerably higher than the market price, implying
that the investment of the market resource rent and even the entire marked-
valued output into man-made capital can be not enough to compensate for
damages caused by the resource extraction. In other words, GI in accounting
prices can be negative despite any e¤ort in saving, implying that for some
ine¢ cient economies, institutional and resource policies are prerequisites of
sustainability.
Section 4 discusses possible problems with using Proposition 1 for sus-
tainability evaluation, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Investment and growth under distortions
In order to dene a distorted economy, it is instructive to introduce rst
a perfect or undistorted optimizing economy. Following Hamilton and
Hartwick (2005, p. 618), assume that the economy is closed, time t is contin-
uous, consumption is aggregated into a single good C; labor is xed, so that
output Q(t) = F (K;R) depends on man-made capital K(t) and the resource
5The accounting price of the resource stock shows the change in the economys long-
term welfare when the resource stock is changed by one unit.
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ow R(t) =   _S(t); where S(t) is the current resource stock ( _S := dS=dt).
The technology is stationary (F does not depend explicitly on t).
A number of studies, which results were used for practical evaluation of
sustainability, assume that the economy satises the following:
 F (K;R) is a regular production function that (a) denotes the maximum
output for the given K and R; and (b) satises the Inada conditions, in
particular FR > 0 (resource productiveness), where FR := @F=@R;
 output Q equals F (K;R) (static e¢ ciency);6
 the balance equation holds: C + _K = F (K;R)   K; where _K is
investment and K with  = const is capital decay (non-wastefulness);
 the standard HR _FR = rFR7 holds as a necessary condition of dynamic
e¢ ciency;
 the economy (a planner) maximizes a (social) welfare function (opti-
mality).
In the real world, however, the resource use can be
non-productive (FR = 0) or counter-productive (FR < 0);8
productive, but static-ine¢ cient (Q < F (K;R));
productive, static-e¢ cient, but wasteful: (C + _K < F (K;R)  K);
productive, static-e¢ cient, non-wasteful, but dynamically ine¢ cient;
productive, non-wasteful, e¢ cient, but non-optimal.
This paper assumes that there is a vectorD(t) = (D1(t); D2(t); D3(t); D4(t));
called distortion, where Di are the distortions in
production: F = F (K;R;D1); (1)
social utility: U = U(C;D2); (2)
the balance equation: _K = F (K;R;D1)  C   K  D3; (3)
the dynamics of the stock: _S =  R +D4: (4)
The distortions can include imperfections, externalities, and any e¤ects (in-
cluding favorable for sustainability) that cause violation of the standard HR.
Assume, for simplicity, thatD depends only on the extracted amount S0 
6Conventionally, e¢ ciency is dened via the Pareto-optimality. Some studies, e.g.
Hurwicz (1960), called this notion non-wastefulness.
7Here, r(t) := FK(t)   is the market interest rate.
8The resource use is counter-productive when the decline in the resource stock results
in the decline of output, e.g., as a result of a wildre or oil spill.
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S(t):9 For example, D1 andD2 can result from irreversible damages caused by
economic activities (stock externalities, e.g., due to climate change); D3 can
stand for the growing cost of extraction (best-quality stock extracted rst)
or for static ine¢ ciency and (or) for wastefulness of the economy (D3 > 0);
D4 can be the productivity of the stock-augmenting investment, which is,
rst, growing with the extraction due to learning-by-doing and eventually
declining due to the scarcity of the resource. Let D5 be a deviation of the
ratio _FR=FR from a dynamically e¢ cient path. Then the following result
holds.
Lemma 1. In economy (1)-(4),
_FR = [v(t) + (t)]FR; (5)
where v(t) := FK   ;10 (t)11=  [D(t)] := D5 + @D4=@(S0   S)
+
1
FR

UD2@D2=@(S0   S)
UC
+ FD1
@D1
@(S0   S)  
@D3
@(S0   S)

; (6)
and D5 = 0 if the economy is dynamically e¢ cient.
Proof is in Appendix 1.
Deviation D5 may depend on D; for example, on D4 when a planner does
not take into account resource-augmenting investments (D5 =  @D4=@(S0 
S); Section 3.1), or on D1 and D2 when the planner ignores the damages
caused by the resource extraction (Section 3.2). In this framework, dynamic
e¢ ciency is a relative notion. The planners optimal path may be dynamically
ine¢ cient with respect to the rst-best solution, e.g., because the planner
underestimates future production possibilities and considers the rst-best
9D can also depend on the rate of extraction, e.g., when damage includes the oppor-
tunity cost (Gaudet et al., 2006), or when damage is partly reversible. Then formula (6)
below is more complicated, which, however, does not alter the conclusions of the paper.
D can also depend on the amount of non-extracted resource, e.g., when the stock has an
amenity value (DAutume, Schubert, 2008). Then, if this value can be expressed in terms
of utility, the problem can be reformulated by introducing the damage resulted from the
resource extraction. In practice, this approach can be more precise, since the uncertainty
in the extracted amount is essentially less than in the remaining stock. A review of studies
with the modied HR can be found, e.g., in Gaudet (2007).
10v(t) is the market interest rate only with no distortion.
11(t) is the additive HR modier or the inuence of D: This inuence in equation (5)
can be expressed in a multiplicative form: _FR = v [D]FR; where  [D] := 1 +  [D] =v:
With no distortion,  = 0:
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paths as infeasible (Section 3.1). The planners optimal path may also appear
ine¢ cient when the planner does not account for damages while estimating
social progress. In the latter case, the planner may even consider the rst-
best path as ine¢ cient due to the di¤erence between the units of measure
for utility in the planners and in the rst-best solutions (Section 3.2).
In some cases, however, D5 may not depend on D; and instead, both D5
andDmay be determined by the same phenomena, e.g. imperfect institution
(Section 3.3). Lemma 1 is not relevant in these cases.
Genuine investment dened in Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) is
G(t) := _K(t) + _S(t)FR(t): (7)
This measure includes not only current investment into man-made capital
but the value of the currently extracted resource estimated in marginal re-
source productivity, which, with no distortion, coincides with the market
price. Hence, G indicates a combination of investment and resource policies.
Since utility can be distorted by D2; the dependence of utility on con-
sumption can be nonmonotonic, and, therefore, consumption cannot sub-
stitute utility as a measure of well-being (see, e.g., Section 3.2). Hence, the
proposition below establishes the link between G and _U (instead of _C), which
includes the link between G and _C as a special case.
Proposition 1. Current utility change is
_U = (v   _G=G)GUC +	; (8)
where 	 := _SFRUCD5 is the inuence of dynamic ine¢ ciency.
Proof is in Appendix 2.
When the economy is dynamically e¢ cient (D5 = 	 = 0), Proposition
1 coincides with the result of Hamilton and Withagen (2007), expressed in
present prices, and, with no distortion, with the result of Hamilton and
Hartwick (2005). Equation (8) shows, that investment (7) can indeed deter-
mine _U if	 is relatively small. However, _U can be also completely determined
by 	 when the term

v   _G=G

GUC is close to zero.
Of course, sharp changes in G can determine an instant sign of _U despite
the large values of 	: Formula (8) shows that if there is a t = t; such that
	(t) has a large positive (negative) value, _U(t) can be negative (positive)
if G(t) is negative (positive) and _G(t)=G(t) has a large positive (negative)
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value. However, these cases are not relevant to sustainability due to the
boundedness of investments, whereas distortions in general are less restricted.
The boundedness of investment implies that the larger is 	; the shorter is the
period of time when these cases are possible. Therefore, neglecting the short-
run oscillations, it can be assumed, for determinateness, that 0 < v(t) < 1
and
 _G=G < v along the long-run trends12 for all t > 0 and the current
investment _K is bounded by the current outputQ: Then a feasible investment
can be dened as follows.
Denition 1. Investment _K(t) = w(t)Q(t) is feasible if w(t) 2 (0; 1) and
j _G=Gj < v for any t > 0:
Denition 1 results in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. Equation (8) implies that
(I) _U R 0 i¤
	 R  

v   _G=G

GUC ; or G R   _SFRD5=

v   _G=G

; or (9)
D5
8<: Q  

v   _G=G

_K=

_SFR

+ 1

; when _S < 0;
R  

v   _G=G

_K=

_SFR

+ 1

; when _S > 0;
(10)
(II) a feasible investment policy can change the sign of _U i¤
 

v   _G
G

<
 

v   _G
G

Q
_SFR
+ 1

<
9=;D5
8<: <  

v   _G
G

Q
_SFR
+ 1

; when _S < 0;
<  

v   _G
G

; when _S > 0:
(11)
The following examples show that the impact of dynamic ine¢ ciency on
the e¢ cacy of investment depends on the level of output and the share of
the resource rent in output. Assume that D4 = 0 ( _S < 0); v = 0:06 and
_G=G = 0:03 at t > 0:
12The analysis can be easily complemented by the case with
 _G=G > v:
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(a) Large resource-poor economy. Let Q(t) = 101 and _S(t)FR(t) =
 1: Then (Corollary 1) an investment policy can change the sign of _U(t) i¤
 0:03 < D5 < 3:
(b) Small resource-rich economy. In the case with Q(t) = 11 and
_S(t)FR(t) =  10; an investment policy can a¤ect the sign of _U(t) i¤
 0:03 < D5 < 0:003:
It is intuitive that a large economy has more opportunities in investment
than a small one, and so the range for D5; in which investment is able to
a¤ect the sign of utility change, is larger in case (a) than in case (b). Another
di¤erence between these two cases is that investment in a large resource-
poor economy can change the sign of _U mostly when D5 a¤ects _U negatively
(positive D5 reduces _U when _S < 0). In this example, the range of D5 > 0; in
which investment is able to compensate for the damage from the ine¢ ciency,
is 100 times larger than the range of D5 < 0; which positive e¤ect can be
annihilated by negative G: This asymmetry is inverted in a small resource-
rich economy.
Assume that _S < 0:13 Then boundedness of investments implies that,
from the planners point of view, the current state of an economy belongs
to the one of the four following types determined by di¤erent roles of re-
source (institutional) and investment policies in the current change of utility
depending on the level of distortion D5:
(A) D5 >  

v   _G=G
 h
Q=

_SFR

+ 1
i
: utility declines regardless of
investment; non-negative values of _U can be obtained only by reduction of
the ine¢ ciency if it is still possible.14
(B) 0 < D5 <  

v   _G=G
 h
Q=

_SFR

+ 1
i
: utility growth can be
achieved by investment policy alone; the optimal saving rate may be higher
than under 	 = 0 in order to compensate not only for the shrinking natural
capital but for the negative e¤ect of ine¢ ciency (e.g., van der Ploeg 2011).
13The inequalities below are inverted when _S > 0: An example that allows for the
growing reserve stock is provided in Section 3.1. The case with _S > 0 may lead to some
interesting implications that require a separate study.
14Possibility of reduction of ine¢ ciency depends on the state of the economy with respect
to tipping points. This problem is not considered in the present paper.
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Without a policy reducing D5; the level of utility can be lower than under
	 = 0:
(C)  

v   _G=G

< D5 < 0 : utility growth can be achieved by invest-
ment policy alone; the optimal saving rate can be lower than under 	 = 0
due to the positive e¤ect from D5; decline in utility is still possible when
G <   _SFRD5=

v   _G=G

< 0:
(D) D5 <  

v   _G=G

: utility grows regardless of investments; invest-
ment policy is important as a determinant of the level of utility along the
growing path.
Types C and D may correspond to the economy where the planner un-
derestimates future production possibilities (Section 3.1).
Condition (9) shows that, for 	 < 0; the minimum investment G that
provides non-declining utility can be essentially higher than zero. The next
section shows that the value of G guaranteeing _U > 0 may not exist.
3. Dynamic ine¢ ciency and sustainability: Examples
In the examples below, D5 denotes a deviation of the planners optimal
ratio _FR=FR from a rst-best path and eD5  a deviation of the rst-best
path from the planners optimal path (D5 =   eD5).
3.1. Resource-augmenting technical change
Assume that in a real economy, D4 is the only distortion, namely, _S =
 R + S(LR=L);15 where LR=L is the share of the resource-augmenting re-
search sector and () > 0 is the rate of growth of the resource stock due to
research (Takayama, 1980). According to (6), this problem yields condition
(5) with  =  :
Assume also that a social planner does not use the information about
 and works with the undistorted model. Then, from the planners point
of view, the dynamics of the real economy without government interven-
tion is non-optimal with eD5 =  ;16 which corresponds to the type C or
D (depending on the behavior of ) with growing consumption when G >
15Note that when  > R=S; the distortion D4 results in _S > 0:
16Utility is not distorted here (UD2 = 0); hence, formula (8) becomes _C =
v   _G=G

G+ _SFRD5; since _U = UC _C + UD2 _D2:
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_SFR=

v   _G=G

(the investment G may be negative here when _S < 0). In
fact, the reduced optimalplanners paths of resource extraction and con-
sumption are dynamically ine¢ cient withD5 =   eD5 =  @D4=@(S0 S) = ;
and if D4 and a correspondent increment in consumption are taken into ac-
count, then D5  0 and consumption grows only when G > 0: Hence, in
this example, the discrepancy between theory and real life results in a sus-
tainable but ine¢ cient path. Dynamic ine¢ ciency can be reduced only by
adjustment of the resource policy when the planner updates the informa-
tion about reserve estimates. This adjustment can result in sustainable and
asymptotically e¢ cient economy.
3.2. Irreversible damages to utility and production
Let a social utility and production are negatively a¤ected in a real econ-
omy by the damage D = D1 = D2 caused by a stock externality17 (D(S0 S) >
0; UD < 0; FD < 0). If a planner disregards the damage, then, accord-
ing to Lemma 1, the planners paths are dynamically ine¢ cient with D5 =
 (FD + UD=UC)D(S0 S)=FR > 0:18 The planners problem reduces in this
case to the one of Solow (1974) - Hartwick (1977), where, under the maximin
criterion, the path of extraction starts from a higher level than in the e¢ cient
case,19 and the economy follows a constant-consumption path (due to G = 0)
with a higher level than the initial level of the e¢ cient path. Since for the
planner, UD = FD = 0; formula (8) becomes _C =

v   _G=G

G:
In reality, however, the change in well-being is20
_U =

v   _G=G

GUC + (FDUC + UD) _D; (12)
which is negative under the undistortedrules of investment and extraction
(G = 0), since (FDUC + UD) _D < 0: Denote   = min _G=G for all feasible G:
17E.g., D can result from irreversible climate change (Stollery, 1998).
18As usual, UC > 0:
19When damage a¤ects only production, Stollery (1998, p. 735) showed that the optimal
extraction starts from a lower initial level and declines slower than in the case with no
damage. The same result for the damage in utility was obtained in Bazhanov (2011,
formula (33), Fig. 4).
20Formula (12) can be obtained from formula (8) using the expression for D5 and the
fact that _D =   _SD(S0 S):
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Then, according to Corollary 1, investment G that provides _U > 0 does not
exist when the damage is large, namely, when
(FDUC + UD) _D <   (v    )

Q+ _SFR

< 0:
Hence, the undistortedpolicies result in ine¢ ciency and unsustainability
of this economy.
The growth of utility can be achieved in this case only when the planner
recognizes the damage and reconsiders the measure of progress in the society.
This done, the planner, situated in the Solow-Hartwick case, can obtain a
sustainable and optimal paths by changing the resource policy alone, namely,
by reducing extraction, while the investment rule remains the same.21
3.3. Insecure property rights
Following Arrow et al. (2003, p. 664), assume that the owner i (i =
1 : : : N ;N > 2) extracts a liquid resource from the pool with the stock Si:
All N owners are identical, non-cooperative, and the pools are separated by
porous barriers. The resource di¤uses from larger pools to smaller ones with
the same rate  > 0:22 Then the depletion equations are
_Si = 
X
j 6=i
(Sj   Si) Ri; i = 1:::N;
where Ri = Ri(t) is the rate of extraction of the owner i at the moment t: The
necessary conditions for PV-maximization of the each owners utility yield
equation (5) with   D5 = (N   1) > 0 (socially e¢ cient paths require
N = 1). This ine¢ ciency results in the distorted path of extraction
RD =
PN
i=1Ri = [(+D5) =]S0e
 (+D5)t=
with the higher initial rate RD(0) and faster decline _RD than for the e¢ cient
path
R = [=]S0e
 t=:
In these formulas,  > 0 is the social discount rate, and  > 1  the
elasticity of marginal utility. Hence, the distorted equation for the whole
21Stollery (1998) showed that the Hartwick rule (G = 0) is still optimal in this economy.
22No barriers corresponds to !1:
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reserve is _S =  R + D4; where D4 = R   RD: Lemma 1 is not relevant in
this example, since D4 does not depend directly on the extracted resource
S0 S; and deviationD5 does not depend onD4; both these distortions result
from imperfect institutions, expressed in N > 2 and  > 0:23
Let v = 0:06; and _G=G =  0:04: Since _S < 0 and D5 > 0 for any t > 0;
a feasible investment policy can change the sign of _U i¤ (Corollary 1)
(N   1) <  0:1
h
Q=

_SFR

+ 1
i
> 0:
When this condition is not satised, only institutional changes and resource
policies can prevent decline in utility. An investment results in not declining
utility here i¤
G >  10(N   1) _SFR > 0 or w >   [10(N   1)+ 1]

_SFR=Q

;
which is very restrictive for N > 1:
It is illustrative to consider two cases.
(a) Large resource-poor economy (Q = 101; _SFR =  1). In this case, _K
can change the sign of _U i¤ (N 1) < 10; which means, e.g., that, for  = 1;
utility declines for any investment (type A) if N > 11: Let N = 5: Then the
saving rate, compensating for the shrinking resource and ine¢ ciency, should
be no less than wmin = 41101 (or G=Q >
40
101
), whereas with no distortion
(N = 1), utility grows for any w > 1
101
(or G > 0).
(b) Small resource-rich economy (Q = 11; _SFR =  10). _K can change
the sign of _U i¤ (N 1) < 0:01; e.g., for  > 0:01 and N > 2; utility declines
regardless of any feasible investment. Let  = 0:009 and N = 2: Then not
declining utility is possible when almost all output is being invested, namely,
w > 10:9
11
(or G=Q > 0:9
11
), although, for this resource-dependent economy,
23Formally, the link D5(D4) is D5 =     (=t)W

D4t=S0   (t=) e (t=)

; where
W [] is the Lambert W function (see, e.g., Corless et al., 1996). Numerically, using
computational software (e.g., Maple), this formula gives D5 = (N   1) for any t when
arg fW []g >  1=e: Also, formally, D4 changes with S0   S(t); since both are changing
in time. However, it can be shown that D4 cannot be represented as a function of S0   S
only. Namely, the assumption D4 = D4 (S0   S) ; given  ; the expression D4 = R   RD;
and using Lemma 1, results in D4 = (N   1) (S0   S)+D4(0); since D1 = D2 = D3 = 0:
Here, D4(0) =   (N   1)S0=: However, since the reserve S0 is xed, D4 must result
only in intertemporal redistribution of the resource, namely, the condition
R1
0
D4dt = 0
must hold, which is not true for D4 derived in this way.
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even with no distortion (N = 1), the saving rate yielding at least constant
utility must be very high, namely, wmin =   _SFR=Q  0:91:
Hence, the use of the policies for the undistorted model in this example
also results in ine¢ ciency and unsustainability; moreover, a feasible invest-
ment compensating for the ine¢ ciency and providing non-declining current
utility may not exist.
4. Multiple resources and distortions
Proposition 1 can be generalized in a straightforward way for n resources.
Then formula (7) becomes
G(t) := _K(t) +
nX
i=1
_Si(t)FRi(t); (13)
and, applying the same approach for the proof, the combined inuence of all
the ine¢ ciencies on utility can be dened as
	 := UC
nX
i=1
_SiFRiD5i: (14)
Equations (8) and (14) show that the combined e¤ect of all distortions
on the current change of aggregate utility can be positive despite the un-
sustainable extraction of some resources. The problem originates from the
assumption that the components of consumption are substitutes. This as-
sumption implies a specic way of aggregation of all the factors that can
inuence consumption and utility. Then, for example, according to formula
(14), a common pool situation (D5 > 0) for one resource can be compensated
by the resource-augmenting investment for another resource, when a planner
does not take into account both these distortions. An indicator using this
aggregation will show that the current utility should grow, despite the known
problems in the future.
The inuence of distortions in the resource extraction on _U is similar to
the one of investment policies due to the boundedness of the resource stock.
Indeed, formula (8) with 	  0 shows that utility can grow in the short run
due to declining investments even when G < 0 (when _G=G > v); although
this case has nothing to do with sustainability, since the boundedness of the
saving rate and the resource reserve will eventually result in _G=G < v and in
14
_U < 0: Future growth in utility is possible, but only after a period of decline.
The case with G > 0 is di¤erent because this reserve of investment can
be used during the innite period of time by maintaining this level of G
or asymptotically diminishing it to zero, which will positively a¤ect utility
change during this period. However, a positive G by itself cannot guarantee
sustainability, because utility will decline when _G=G > v:
In the same way, the instant sign of 	 shows only current inuence
of distortions on _U; whereas sustainability depends on the trends. Hence,
Proposition 1 and an indicator based on formula (8) can, of course, pro-
vide useful policy recommendations for underinvesting and overextracting
economies; however, such an indicator, calibrated for a specic economy,
cannot guarantee even theoretically the existence of an economic program
with non-declining utility during a long period of time, and it cannot show if
the ability of the economy to maintain non-declining utility is improving.24
5. Concluding remarks
This study assumed that a social planner of a resource-based economy
constructed optimal paths using a model that is not su¢ ciently adequate to
the problem, e.g., due to imperfection in knowledge or in institutions. In
order to imitate this discrepancy between theory and real life, the study has
extended the result of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005) regarding the role of
genuine investment (GI) in current utility change (CUC) by assuming that
1) there are distortions that a¤ect utility, production, balance equation, and
the dynamics of the resource stock; and 2) the planner does not take into
account some of these distortions. As a result, the planners paths are only
second-best optimal and dynamically ine¢ cient. Proposition 1 shows the
link between GI and CUC depending on the inuence of this ine¢ ciency.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 have shown that CUC can be determined
by GI, measured in the marginal resource productivity, only when the in-
uence of the disregarded distortions is close to zero. These results entail a
classication of the status of a resource-based economy by the importance
of investment or resource policies or both for CUC. The study has shown
that the distortions asymmetrically a¤ect the ability of investment to control
CUC, and this asymmetry is mutually inverted for capital-rich-resource-poor
and capital-poor-resource-rich economies.
24E.g., in an overconsuming economy with _U > 0, this ability is declining.
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The examples of neglected distortions demonstrated that a dynamically
ine¢ cient economy may be sustainable, when the planner underestimates
future production possibilities, or unsustainable, when the planner ignores
institutional imperfections or damages from economic activities. The exam-
ples also have shown that a feasible level of GI that provides a positive CUC
may not exist.
Since an economy is unsustainable when current utility declines, the re-
sults of this study imply that for sustainability of real economies, 1) institu-
tional and resource policies may be more important than investment policies
when the level of ine¢ ciency is high; 2) it is preferable that a resource policy
is more conservative than is prescribed by a theory. In the former conclusion,
investment policy, of course, is still important as a determinant of the level
of utility along a growing or declining path and as a determinant of growth
when the level of ine¢ ciency is low. In the latter one, an overly conservative
resource policy may result in dynamic ine¢ ciency, but with updates in knowl-
edge, the policy can be corrected, and the economy can be asymptotically
e¢ cient.
Besides regular consequences caused by deviation of real life from theory,
an indicator based on CUC may not reect sustainability of an economy,
because, by construction, it does not show the change in the ability of the
economy to maintain non-declining utility during a long period of time. Ar-
row et al. (2003) showed that, in order to evaluate current sustainability
change, the accounting prices should be used for measuring GI; an indica-
tor based on these prices presumably should contain not only the values of
current investment and the rate of extraction, but the amounts of capital,
resource reserve, and the information about moderate (preferably underesti-
mating) assumptions concerning the paths of production possibilities.
6. Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Geir Asheim and other participants of the 4th World
Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists for very useful com-
ments and advice.
7. Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1
Since optimal paths are always e¢ cient, a necessary condition of dynamic
e¢ ciency for economy (1)-(4) can be obtained from optimality conditions,
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e.g., in the problem of PV-maximization25 of
R1
0
U(C;D2)(t)dt with a dis-
count factor (t): The Hamiltonian of this problem is H = U(C;D2)(t) +
K(F   C   K   D3) + S(D4   R); and the Pontryagin-type necessary
conditions are
HC = UC(t)  K = 0; (15)
HR = KFR   S = 0; (16)
_K =  
@H
@K
=  K (FK   ) ; (17)
_S =  
@H
@S
=  (t)UD2
@D2
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
 
K

FD1
@D1
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
  @D3
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S

 
S
@D4
@ (S0   S)
@ (S0   S)
@S
: (18)
Equation (18) with K from (15) becomes
_S = (t)UD2D2(S0 S) +
UC(t)

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)

+ SD4(S0 S) : (19)
The time derivative of equation (16) is _S = _KFR + K _FR; which, com-
bined with (19), results in
_KFR + K _FR = (t)
h
UD2D2(S0 S) + UC

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)
i
+
SD4(S0 S) :
The last equation after dividing through by FR and substitutions for _K
(from (17)) and S (from (16)) becomes
 K (FK   ) + K
_FR
FR
=
(t)
FR
h
UD2D2(S0 S) + UC

FD1D1(S0 S)  D3(S0 S)
i
+
KD4(S0 S) ;
which, divided through by K with substitution for K from (15), yields
_FR=FR = FK    +  (D) ; where  (D) is dened by formula (6)
25The maximin, formulated as maxr;c
R1
0
Ue tdt  U = const(r; c) with the addi-
tional constraint U(C;D2) = U; yields the same result.
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8. Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows the approach of Hamilton and Hartwick (2005, Propo-
sition 1), which was rst applied in Hartwick (1977). The di¤erences are that
the current proof uses: 1) utility as a measure of well-being (due to distortion
D2); 2) formula (5) to substitute for _FR instead of the standard HR. Namely,
equations (3), (1), and (7) give
_C = _KFK + _RFR + _D1FD1    _K   K   _D3
= _KFK + _RFR + _D1FD1    _K   K   _D3 +R _FR  R _FR
= (FK   ) _K   (FK    + )FRR 
h
K   d (RFR) =dt
i
+ _D1FD1   _D3:
From (4), R =   _S +D4: Then
_C = (FK   ) _K   (FK    + )FR

  _S +D4

 
h
K   d
n
  _S +D4

FR
o
=dt
i
+ _D1FD1   _D3
= (FK   ) _K + (FK   )FR _S   (FK   )FRD4   FRR
 
h
K + d
n
_SFR
o
=dt
i
+ d fD4FRg =dt + _D1FD1   _D3
or
_C = vG  _G  vFRD4 + d fD4FRg =dt+ _D1FD1   _D3   FRR: (20)
Using Lemma 1,
FRR =
UD2@D2=@(S0   S)
UC
R + FD1
R@D1
@(S0   S)  
R@D3
@(S0   S)
+
FRR@D4
@(S0   S) +D5FRR:
SinceDi; by assumption, depend only on the extracted stock S0 S; equations
R =   _S+D4 and _Di =   _S@Di=@(S0 S) = R@Di=@(S0 S) D4@Di=@(S0 
S) yield R@Di=@(S0   S) = _Di +D4@Di=@(S0   S): Then
FRR = D5FRR +
UD2
UC
_D2 + FD1 _D1   _D3 + _D4FR
 D4

UD2@D2=@(S0   S)
UC
+
FD1@D1
@(S0   S)  
@D3
@(S0   S) +
FR@D4
@(S0   S)

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or
FRR =
UD2
UC

_D2 +
D4@D2
@(S0   S)

+ FD1

_D1 +
D4@D1
@(S0   S)

 

_D3 +
D4@D3
@(S0   S)

+ FR

_D4 +
D4@D4
@(S0   S)

+D5FRR:
Substitution of the last formula into (20) results in
_C = vG  _G  vFRD4 +D4 _FR   UD2
UC

_D2 +
D4@D2
@(S0   S)

 FD1
D4@D1
@(S0   S) +
D4@D3
@(S0   S)   FR
D4@D4
@(S0   S)  D5FRR;
which, after substitution for _FR from (5), becomes
_C = vG  _G+ FRD4   UD2
UC

_D2 +
D4@D2
@(S0   S)

(21)
 FD1
D4@D1
@(S0   S) +
D4@D3
@(S0   S)   FR
D4@D4
@(S0   S)  D5FRR:
Note that
FRD4 = D5FRD4 +
UD2
UC
D4@D2
@(S0   S) + FD1
D4@D1
@(S0   S)
+FR
D4@D4
@(S0   S)  
D4@D3
@(S0   S) :
Substitution of this expression into (21), using (4), results in
_C = vG  _G  UD2
UC
_D2 + _SFRD5;
which, after substitution into _U = UC _C + UD2 _D2; yields formula (8) of the
proposition.
When economy (1)-(4) is dynamically e¢ cient (D5 = 0), formula (8) can
be obtained from the result of Dixit et al. (1980, Theorem 1) or from a
generalization of this result in Hamilton and Withagen (2007). Namely, in
terms of the present value prices of utility, capital, and the resource, dened
in Lemma 1 as (t); K ; and S; these results claim that
(t) _U =   d
dt

K _K + S _S

;
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which, using formulas (15)-(17), can be rewritten as follows:
(t) _U =   d
dt

K

_K +
S
K
_S

=   d
dt
h
K

_K + FR _S
i
=   d
dt
[KG] =  K

_K
K
G+ _G

= K
h
(FK   )G  _G
i
:
Then, with the use of formula (15) and the notation v := FK   , it becomes
_U =

v   _G=G

GUC ;
which is formula (8) for D5 = 0
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